Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Philolaus and Jonathan Kvanvig

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19 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]