Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Peter van Inwagen and M. Tullius Cicero

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91 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero]
A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]
Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero]
It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero]
If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero]
Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero]