Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Paul Benacerraf and David van Reybrouck

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42 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf]
Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C]
A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf]
To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf]
Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf]
The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend]
No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe]
If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf]
The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf]
The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf]
Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf]
Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf]
How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf]
Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck]
There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck]
Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck]
Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck]