Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Novalis and A.George / D.J.Velleman

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman]
The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman]
Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman]
'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman]
A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman]
The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman]
The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman]
Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman]
Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman]
Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman]
Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Every person has his own language [Novalis]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]