33 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |