Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Kenneth Kunen and David S. Oderberg

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35 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
An 'equivalence' relation is one which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive [Kunen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]