Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Keith Hossack and Peter F. Strawson

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
10843 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10676 The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
10686 The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23623 Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
23624 The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
23625 Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10687 Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10677 Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8358 There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
23627 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
6413 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
8354 Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10666 Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
10669 Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
10675 A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
10673 Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
10680 The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10684 I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
23626 Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10674 A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10681 In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
10685 Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
23621 Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
23622 We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10668 We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
16980 We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10664 Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
10678 The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
10665 Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
10682 The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16979 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
10663 A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
8356 The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
10430 Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10448 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
8355 Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
8357 If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
10683 We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]