Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Keith Campbell and Anjan Chakravarrty

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15148 Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
15145 A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15147 Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15144 Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15146 Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15151 Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]