Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Jonathan Kvanvig and Samir Okasha

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

22 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
22180 Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22177 Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
22172 Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22174 The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
22175 Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22182 Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
22185 Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22176 Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22178 If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
22173 Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17366 Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha]