Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Jonathan Bennett and Julia Driver

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17 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]