97 ideas
| 21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| 22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
| 6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
| 23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
| 23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
| 22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
| 17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
| 17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
| 17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
| 23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
| 23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22062 | Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte] |
| 22015 | The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
| 21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
| 23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
| 22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
| 21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
| 21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
| 21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
| 21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
| 21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
| 23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
| 23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
| 23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
| 22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
| 23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
| 23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
| 23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
| 23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
| 21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
| 23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
| 22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
| 23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
| 23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
| 22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
| 23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
| 23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
| 22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |