Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, James Robert Brown and G Edelman / G Tononi

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


55 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR]
When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR]
For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR]
The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Prior to language, concepts are universals created by self-mapping of brain activity [Edelman/Tononi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Cultures have a common core of colour naming, based on three axes of colour pairs [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A sense of self begins either internally, or externally through language and society [Edelman/Tononi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Brains can initiate free actions before the person is aware of their own decision [Edelman/Tononi]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Brain complexity balances segregation and integration, like a good team of specialists [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts and generalisations result from brain 'global mapping' by 'reentry' [Edelman/Tononi, by Searle]
Concepts arise when the brain maps its own activities [Edelman/Tononi]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR]
The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR]