14 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 8083 | Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin] |
| 7727 | Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner] |
| 8686 | Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend] |
| 22277 | Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |