23 ideas
18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |