Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Herbert B. Enderton and Tuckness,A/Wolf,C

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70 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton]
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton]
A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton]
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton]
The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf]
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf]
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf]
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf]
Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf]
If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf]