20 ideas
| 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
| 15923 | Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine] |
| 10180 | Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré] |
| 9916 | Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam] |
| 18203 | Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré] |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |