Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Gregory L. Murphy and Gerhard Gentzen

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31 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy]
Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy]
The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy]
The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy]
Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy]
Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy]
The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy]
Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy]
Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy]
Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy]
The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]