Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Gabriel M.A. Segal and Sebastian Gardner

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
21463 Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
21459 Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21460 Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
21443 Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
21444 Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
21453 Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
8108 Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
8112 Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
8111 Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
8109 Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner]