Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, F.H. Bradley and Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E.

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
5182 Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
6864 Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
6422 Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
7966 Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
6404 British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
22299 Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
21343 Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5655 Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
6406 Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]