Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, F.H. Bradley and David Liggins

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
5182 Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
6864 Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
14231 We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
6422 Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
7966 Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14233 Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
6404 British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
22299 Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
21343 Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5655 Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
6406 Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]