51 ideas
| 20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
| 19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
| 1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
| 1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
| 1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
| 1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
| 1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
| 1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
| 1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
| 1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
| 1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
| 1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
| 1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
| 1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
| 20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
| 20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
| 1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
| 20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
| 20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| 20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
| 20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
| 20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
| 20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
| 20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
| 20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
| 1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
| 20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
| 20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
| 1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
| 1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
| 20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
| 20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
| 20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
| 20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
| 20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
| 20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
| 20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
| 20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
| 20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
| 20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |