353 ideas
| 7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
| 16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| 2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
| 2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
| 2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| 2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
| 9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
| 23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
| 23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| 4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| 2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
| 23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
| 23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
| 2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
| 18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
| 18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
| 18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
| 10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
| 7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
| 7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
| 18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
| 23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
| 18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
| 11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
| 23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
| 18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
| 13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
| 10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
| 18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
| 18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
| 7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
| 23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
| 18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
| 4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
| 4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
| 7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
| 9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
| 15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
| 19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
| 6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| 18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
| 18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
| 18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
| 18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
| 23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
| 21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
| 22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
| 21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| 8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
| 18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| 22312 | Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| 22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
| 7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| 8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
| 4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
| 8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
| 23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| 23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
| 10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| 22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| 9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
| 15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
| 23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
| 23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
| 11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
| 23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
| 18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
| 7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
| 6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
| 18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| 4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
| 3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
| 3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
| 4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| 17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
| 2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| 18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
| 18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| 17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| 18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| 18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
| 19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
| 7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
| 23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
| 23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
| 4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
| 6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
| 4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
| 7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
| 4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
| 7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
| 12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
| 4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
| 12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
| 7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| 23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
| 18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
| 18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
| 7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
| 4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
| 4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
| 4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
| 18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
| 4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
| 4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
| 4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
| 4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
| 23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
| 23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
| 6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
| 7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
| 4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
| 4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
| 5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
| 4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
| 4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
| 23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
| 4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
| 11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
| 6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
| 2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
| 2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
| 18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
| 4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |