18 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |