906 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21461 | I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
22308 | Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
8209 | Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
21517 | Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell] |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
21522 | Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell] |
21523 | We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell] |
23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
21521 | Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell] |
23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
21528 | Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell] |
21527 | On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell] |
23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
21526 | Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell] |
23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
21525 | When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell] |
23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
21518 | Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell] |
23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
21519 | We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell] |
23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
21524 | The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell] |
23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
23019 | The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
23021 | Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
21520 | That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell] |