Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Bernard Linsky and Mark Sainsbury

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]