Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Barry Maund and Robin F. Hendry

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

20 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17486 Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
17481 Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
17478 Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
17484 Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
17479 The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
17485 Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
17482 Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
17483 Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17476 Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
17477 Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17480 Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]