33 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
7491 | The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |