14 ideas
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |