Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Alvin I. Goldman and Thomas M. Crisp

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]