30 ideas
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |