379 ideas
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 6779 | Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 6780 | Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| 6796 | Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird] |
| 6797 | Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 6800 | Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 6786 | As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 6792 | If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird] |
| 6757 | Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird] |
| 6777 | Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird] |
| 6804 | There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird] |
| 6805 | Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird] |
| 6778 | Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird] |
| 6775 | Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird] |
| 6791 | If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird] |
| 6790 | Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird] |
| 6738 | Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird] |
| 6739 | Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird] |
| 6799 | We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird] |
| 6798 | Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird] |
| 6752 | The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird] |
| 6754 | We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird] |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| 6750 | Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird] |
| 6761 | Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird] |
| 6758 | 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird] |
| 6759 | Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 6756 | Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird] |
| 6760 | An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird] |
| 6785 | Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird] |
| 6788 | Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird] |
| 6787 | Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird] |
| 6751 | Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
| 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
| 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
| 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
| 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
| 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
| 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
| 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
| 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
| 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
| 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
| 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
| 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
| 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
| 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
| 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
| 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
| 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
| 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
| 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
| 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
| 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
| 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
| 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
| 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
| 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
| 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
| 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
| 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
| 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
| 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
| 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
| 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
| 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
| 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
| 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
| 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
| 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
| 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
| 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
| 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
| 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
| 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
| 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
| 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
| 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
| 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
| 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 6776 | Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird] |
| 6767 | Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird] |
| 6768 | Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird] |
| 6770 | Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird] |
| 6771 | Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird] |
| 6773 | If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 6769 | In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird] |
| 6774 | Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
| 6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
| 6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
| 17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| 6753 | Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird] |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| 17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
| 6762 | Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird] |
| 6763 | Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird] |
| 6772 | Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird] |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| 6740 | 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird] |
| 6741 | There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird] |
| 6742 | A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird] |
| 6743 | If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird] |
| 6744 | Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird] |
| 6747 | Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird] |
| 6746 | There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird] |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| 6748 | Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird] |
| 6749 | We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird] |
| 6803 | If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird] |
| 6801 | Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird] |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| 6745 | A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird] |
| 6802 | With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 6789 | If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 6807 | In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |