Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Alan Musgrave and Thomas M. Crisp

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

16 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14025 The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14023 The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14024 Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14021 Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
14020 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14026 Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14022 The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]