13 ideas
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |