Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Ryan Wasserman and E Sosa / M Tooley

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]