61 ideas
| 23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
| 23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
| 23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| 23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| 23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
| 23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
| 23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
| 23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
| 23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
| 23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
| 23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
| 23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
| 23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
| 23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
| 23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
| 23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
| 23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
| 23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
| 23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
| 23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
| 23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
| 20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |
| 23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
| 23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
| 23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
| 23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |