22 ideas
2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |