Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, William W. Tait and F.H. Bradley

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
5182 Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
6864 Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9978 Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
9986 The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9984 We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
13416 Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
6422 Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
7966 Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
6404 British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
22299 Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
21343 Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9981 Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
9982 Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
9985 Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9972 Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
9980 If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5655 Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
6406 Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]