90 ideas
| 13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
| 20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
| 14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
| 14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
| 23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
| 14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
| 14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
| 14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
| 14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
| 14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
| 14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
| 14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
| 14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
| 14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
| 14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
| 14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
| 14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
| 14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
| 14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
| 14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
| 13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
| 23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
| 19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
| 20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
| 23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
| 23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
| 23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
| 23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
| 20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
| 23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
| 23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
| 20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
| 20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
| 20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
| 23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
| 20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
| 20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
| 20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
| 20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
| 20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
| 20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
| 20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
| 20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
| 20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
| 23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
| 23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
| 20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
| 23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
| 23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
| 20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
| 20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
| 23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
| 23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
| 20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
| 20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
| 20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
| 23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
| 23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
| 20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
| 20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
| 23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
| 23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
| 23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
| 23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
| 23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
| 23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
| 23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
| 23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
| 23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| 23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
| 23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
| 20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
| 23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
| 23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
| 23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |