Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, Henry Laycock and Anjan Chakravarrty

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15148 Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
15145 A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15147 Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15144 Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15146 Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15151 Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]