51 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
8917 | The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen] |
8912 | Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen] |
8913 | Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen] |
8914 | Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen] |
8916 | Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen] |
8918 | Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen] |
8919 | Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |