36 ideas
| 18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
| 8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| 18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
| 18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
| 8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
| 8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
| 8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
| 4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
| 10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |