Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, David J.Chalmers and John P. Burgess

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


97 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess]
There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess]
Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess]
How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess]
General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess]
It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]