16 ideas
16030 | 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E] |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |