Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, Brad W. Hooker and Gilbert Ryle

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]