Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G, Bernard Linsky and Roy Sorensen

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]