96 ideas
22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |