88 ideas
1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
16676 | Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham] |
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
9103 | A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
16792 | If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham] |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
9089 | Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham] |
9091 | Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham] |
9100 | Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham] |
9090 | Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham] |
6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
9101 | Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham] |
9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
9104 | A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
16675 | Every extended material substance is composed of parts distant from one another [William of Ockham] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |
9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |