Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pyrrho, Wilfrid Hodges and L.A. Paul

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
1798 He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1800 Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
10476 The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
10282 Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10478 Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10477 |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10283 A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W]
10284 There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W]
10285 I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10474 |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10475 A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
10473 Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
10481 Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10289 Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W]
10288 Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10287 If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
10480 First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10286 A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6593 The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6592 Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1808 Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1801 Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1805 Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1809 Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1804 Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1810 Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1803 Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1806 Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1802 Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1807 Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
3062 There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3063 Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]