97 ideas
| 1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
| 14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
| 9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
| 9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
| 14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
| 9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
| 9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
| 9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
| 14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
| 14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
| 14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
| 9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
| 9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
| 9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
| 14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
| 6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
| 6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
| 9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
| 9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
| 14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |