Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pyrrho, Robert Audi and Isaac Beeckman

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
1798 He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1800 Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6593 The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6592 Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1808 Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1802 Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1807 Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1801 Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1803 Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1806 Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1804 Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1810 Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1805 Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1809 Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
16707 Cold and hot are the swiftness and slowness of corpuscular motion [Beeckman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
3062 There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3063 Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]